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Competitive Escalation and Interventions  
 
 
Abstract (max 250 words) 
Competitive escalation occurs frequently in manageri l nvironments, when decisions create sunk costs 
and decision makers compete under time pressure. In a series of experiments using a minimal dollar 
auction paradigm, we test interventions to prevent competitive escalation. Without any intervention, most 
people, including experienced managers, escalate and lose money by bidding more than the price is worth 
(e.g., more than 10 € for 10 €). We test several interventions, in which we provide individuals with 
different types of experience: direct experience in structurally identical and in structurally similar 
situations, as well as direct experience in similarly competitive situations (lacking the escalation 
dimension). We also study indirect experience based on vicariously learning about the situation’s 
consequences (experienced by others) and based on mental simulation by setting oneself a limit regarding 
where to exit the competition. In three experiments (N = 1229), we find that direct experience in exactly 
the same or a structurally similar situation allows individuals to prevent subsequent escalation, whereas 
direct experience in a similar situation without escalation does not. Indirect experience based on 
vicarious-learning successfully reduces competitive escalation, whereas a goal-setting intervention that 
has proven instrumental in reducing classic escalation of commitment is not effective. This pattern of 
variation in the effectiveness of different interventions is consistent with the theory of a cold‒hot empathy 
gap that prevents people from anticipating how they will experience a competitive situation before 
entering it. As a methodological contribution, we developed a deception-free computer-player dollar-
auction for online participants and a dynamic chicken game.  
 
Keywords: dollar auction, competitive arousal, escalation of commitment, competition, sunk costs, hot-
cold empathy gap, vicarious learning
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Once you’ve put enough in, you’ll go all the way till it’s done, regardless of the value. 
Matthew Dodds from Citigroup about the 2006 acquisition of medical-device maker Guidant after a 
bidding war between Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific1. 
 
Competition is found in almost all domains of life—from playful games to wars between 
nations—whenever at least two parties strive for sca ce resources. In many regards, competition serves 
important societal functions, be it as an inspiring challenge to excel, a motor to innovate, or as the force 
that guides the invisible hand of markets (but see also Kohn, 1992). Under some circumstances, however, 
competitive actions can have adverse consequences for others (e.g., Hoffman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 
1954; Mui, 1995; Münster, 2007; Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, & Reade, 2016; Kilduff & Galinsky, 2017) 
and for the actors themselves (e.g., Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006; Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). It 
is therefore important to understand both the conditions under which competition becomes harmful and 
how decision makers can learn how to guard themselve  against its destructive effects.  
One form of destructive competition goes under the names of positional concerns (Solnick & 
Hemenway, 1998; Frank, 1999), competitive irrationality (Arnett & Hunt, 2002), or positional bias (Hill 
& Buss, 2006). It describes a shift in focus away from absolute payoffs toward one’s relative outcomes in 
comparison with competitors. Winning becomes the goal, even when the personal costs of winning a 
prize are higher than the value of the prize itself (Malhotra, 2010). Prior research has shown that such a 
shift in focus toward a desire to win (Malhotra, 2010; Malhotra, Ku, & Murnighan, 2008) can be fueled 
by the ‘hot’ emotional state of competitive arousal, which is seen as ‘laden with adrenalin’ (Ku et al.,
2005). Such competitive arousal can, for instance, be observed in auctions (“auction fever”), and prior 
research has shown that time pressure and perceptions of rivalry are important antecedents (Ku et al., 
2005; Adam, Krämer, & Müller, 2015).  
                                                      
1Boston Scientific won the bidding war yet paid so much that its share price lost almost one third of its value—
which led Fortune magazine to label the acquisition “the (second) worst deal ever” (Tully & Levenson, 2006). 
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In this article, we examine competition in situations where its consequences are potentially 
particularly severe, namely, situations prone to scalation of commitment, the phenomenon that decision 
makers who have invested in a losing course of action maintain and even increase their commitment after
receiving negative feedback (Sleesman, Conlon, McNamar , & Miles, 2012; Staw, 1976, 1981, 1997). 
Commitment in this context means the allocation of tangible or intangible resources to a specific course 
of action. Escalation of commitment is observed on the micro level of individual decision makers as well 
as on the macro level of organizations (Arkes & Hutzel, 2000; Drummond, 1994; Guler, 2007; Gunia, 
Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Hsie, Tsai, & Chen, 2015; Lee, Keil, & Wong, 2015; Lehenkari, 2012; 
McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002) and is considered to be “one of the most robust and costly decision 
errors addressed in the organizational sciences” (Sleesman et al., 2012, p. 541). When competition is 
introduced in settings prone to escalation of commit ent, a situation we refer to as competitive 
escalation, the destructive consequences of competition identifi d above are likely to be aggravated for 
two reasons: First, the motivational shift toward a esire to win makes increasing one’s commitment even 
more attractive, as it suppresses concerns about the costs involved. Specifically, a desire to win shift  the 
attention from the absolute level of outcomes, which include both the prize to be gained and the costs of 
obtaining the prize, to the relative comparison with one’s competitors, which means either winning the 
prize oneself or watching a competitor win the prize, regardless of the costs winning would entail. 
Second, once decision makers enter the visceral ‘hot’ state of competitive arousal, they may feel 
separated from their ‘cold’ selves by a so-called ‘hot‒cold empathy gap’ (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000). In 
turn, the goals, plans, and intuitions they had in the ‘cold’ state may seem less relevant. In the same way 
as people who shop on an empty stomach tend to ignore their shopping lists and buy more than they need, 
competitively aroused decision makers might escalate their commitment far beyond what they deemed 
rational before competitive arousal.  
To avoid the destructive consequences of competitiv escalation, decision makers need to not 
only learn what they should rationally do but also to vercome such ‘hot‒cold’ empathy gaps so that they 
will not abandon their rational plans once they become competitively aroused. Prior research has 
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established that different types of experience affect what and how effectively individuals learn (Gino, 
Argote, Miron-Spektor, & Todorova, 2010; Huber, 199; Levitt & March, 1988). In this article, we 
distinguish between two types of experience: direct experience and indirect experience (in several 
variants). The costs of competitive escalation can be substantial, which makes failing to learn, and 
learning from direct experience, potentially expensive. The question of which type of experience can best 
help people to learn to address competitive escalation situations is therefore of both practical and 
economic relevance, as such situations occur frequently in the strategic and competitive environments i  
which managers operate (Malhotra et al., 2008). Finding cheaper and more efficient ways of learning can 
help organizations and society to reap the benefits of competition, without paying the costs. 
How people learn to address situations that are prone t  escalation of commitment and that elicit 
visceral ‘hot’ factors, such as competitive arousal, is also of theoretical interest for the literatures on 
competitive arousal and escalation of commitment as well as for the learning literature. Although it may 
be possible to study this question ‘in vivo’ in organizations (e.g., in acquisition bidding wars), the 
incidental nature and lack of controls might make this approach prone to post hoc rationalizations and 
conjecture. Therefore, we compare the effectiveness of different types of learning in reducing competitive 
escalation in a series of lab and online experiments. I  so doing, we make the following contributions: 
First, we illustrate the severity of the situational force of competitive escalation situations by 
showing how difficult it is to learn to address them without first experiencing the specific situation a d 
suffering its adverse consequences directly. Second, we take a first step toward developing interventions 
capable of preparing people for situations prone to competitive escalation. Such interventions need to go 
beyond situational analysis and detailed action plas: “When we act under the influence of passions, they
may cause us to deviate from plans laid in cooler moments” (Elster, 2000, p. 7). We find that a goal-
setting strategy that has previously been found to reduce classic escalation of commitment is not effectiv  
in preventing competitive escalation. In contrast,  new intervention based on vicarious learning (Hoover, 
Giambatista, & Belkin, 2012; Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, & Zbaracki, 2018) succeeds in reducing 
escalation and could potentially be used for training modules, for instance, in management education.  
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The Hot‒Cold Empathy Gap, Competitive Arousal, and Competitive Escalation 
Visceral factors, such as hunger, thirst, pain, moods, and emotions, affect behavior differently 
than nonvisceral factors, such as preferences or information. First, they “tend to ‘crowd out’ virtually all 
goals other than that of mitigating the visceral factor” (Loewenstein, 1996, p. 272). Second, individuals 
not currently experiencing a visceral factor (i.e., in a ‘cold’ state) cannot fully anticipate its effct; they 
underestimate or completely ignore its influence. This failure to empathize with oneself or others in the 
‘hot’ state while one is in a ‘cold’ state is termed the ‘hot‒cold empathy gap’ (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000). 
We argue that competitive arousal is such a visceral state and that, once individuals experience it, they 
value winning against the competition over all other goals, consistent with the notion of a desire to win 
(Malhotra, 2010). Because of this qualitative change in motivation, competitive arousal has particularly 
harmful consequences when it occurs in situations prone to escalation of commitment (i.e., competitive 
escalation situations).  
Whereas competition sometimes helps (e.g., Camerer, Lo wenstein, & Weber, 1989) to diminish 
decision biases, sometimes it does not (e.g., Kühberger & Penner, 2003; Massey & Thaler, 2013; 
Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007), and in specific cases it might even exacerbate them 
(e.g., Radzevick & Moore, 2010). We expect situations prone to escalation of commitment to be among 
these latter cases. It is sometimes rational to persev re even after learning that the course of action taken 
did not lead to the best possible result (but, for instance, was still the best option to choose based on 
expectations; Zikmund-Fisher, 2004). In typical escalation of commitment situations, however, the 
decision maker maintains her or his commitment even after learning that the course of action taken was 
inferior in the first place and likely remains inferior for the future.  
We conceptualize competitive escalation situations as being the intersection between competition 
on the one hand and escalation of commitment on the other; competitive escalation means that the 
escalation is aggravated by the ‘hot’ state of competitive arousal. We adopt from prior research that 
competitive arousal, in turn, results from the combination of time pressure and competition (Ku et al., 
2005; Adam et al., 2015). Competitive escalation situat ons involve the decision to compete with at lest 
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one other party over a non-sharable prize. If, after an initial decision to commit resources, a decision 
maker learns that another party is closer to winning the prize than the decision maker herself, then s 
faces a choice: either to invest more resources in an attempt to catch up with and overtake the other party 
or to give up and let the other party win. The resources already committed are sunk costs: retrospective 
costs that cannot be recovered and should be disregard d when making subsequent decisions (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985). However, if the decision maker enters a ‘hot’ emotional state (of competitive arousal), she 
develops a desire to win against the other party and shifts her focus away from the costs that attempting to 
win would entail (which may be substantial given that the other party is also committed to win). The 
decision maker will therefore be more likely to allocate more resources—to escalate her commitment—
for instance, by continuing to bid in an auction.  
Various high stakes situations share specific characte istics that make them particularly prone to 
competitive escalation, such as that the resources contestants invest are non-refundable, regardless of 
whether they win the competition (Hart, Avrahami, Kareev, & Todd, 2015). For instance, in political 
elections, multiple parties compete for the presidency, but only one party can win. All parties need to 
make initial decisions to commit resources to their campaign, and then, the party that learns it was falling 
behind faces the decision to either intensify their campaigning, or to draw out of the race. While they 
should rationally ignore the already invested resources as sunk costs, it seems unlikely that they are able 
to overcome “one of the most robust and costly decision errors” and escalate their commitment. In the 
2012 US presidential elections, for example, Barack Obama and his contender Mitt Romney both spent 
about $1 billion on their campaigns (Ashkenas, Ericson, Parlapiano, & Willis, 2012). Other examples for 
situational characteristics that enable competitive escalation can be found in mergers and acquisition, 
where multiple firms typically invest in due diligence efforts when they compete to buy another company 
and learn that other bidders may be getting ahead. Thus, even if they do not win the bidding war (and thus 
do not have to pay their bid), they commit resources that turn into sunk costs in the process of placing a 
bid. Similar situations arise in research and development, where multiple teams invest resources in 
developing a new technology, but only the fastest tam can file the patent. 
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In most of these examples, it is possible to construct rational explanations for escalation of 
commitment based on second-order effects. Decision makers may wish to develop a reputation of being 
competitive to deter future attacks (Clark & Montgomery, 1998), ensure a dominant market position for 
their company, to signal to others how far they are willing to go to defend their position, or to lure others 
into paying too much, leaving them as weaker competitors in future bouts. Yet these explanations could 
well be speculations or post hoc rationalizations—ecalation may also occur in situations lacking such 
incentives for strategic behavior (e.g., managing oe’s reputation or weakening one’s rivals). To isolate 
the psychological processes triggered in the situations described above, we have constructed an 
experimental paradigm that resembles these situations in terms of the temporal order of decisions and the 
payoff structure, while excluding such strategic considerations. This allows us to test whether the 
structural features of these situations prompt participants to engage in competitive escalation and 
investigate how different experiences allow individuals to subsequently avoid competitive escalation. 
Our experimental paradigm is a variant of the Dollar Auction Game (Shubik, 1971; Teger, 1980), 
which is a special case of an all-pay auction (Hörisch & Kirchkamp, 2010) and was used in prior 
escalation research (e.g., Ku, 2008). In this game, a fixed sum of money (the exact value is common 
knowledge) is auctioned off to participants. Only the highest bidder receives the money (henceforth 
‘prize’), but both the highest and the second-highest bidder have to pay their respective bids. Every bidder 
can make or raise a bid at any time. The auction ends when a specified time period has elapsed without a 
new bid. This structure creates time pressure, in particular for the second-highest bidder, who is bound to 
lose his bid without reward. Our paradigm thus mimics the structure of resource allocation decisions in 
political campaigns, mergers and acquisitions, and patent races described above: Just as an actor’s effort 
and investment becomes meaningless as soon as a competit r gets ahead, a participant’s bid becomes a 
sunk cost as soon as another participant makes a higher bid.2 By continuing to bid against each other, two 
                                                      
2 Of course, in many naturally occurring situations such as mergers and acquisitions, the sunk costs for he second-
highest bidder are typically lower than the entire bid. We chose this rather extreme case to ensure that the sunk costs 
were salient for our participants in the lab. We agree that, on a relative scale, the sunk costs for the second-highest 




participants enter a spiral of competitive escalation and can easily end up bidding and paying more than
the prize is worth. To give an extreme example, a $20 bill was auctioned off for $2,000 in an executive 
MBA class of approximately 70 students (Murnighan, 2002). Bidding started with fixed $1 increments 
that Murnighan incrementally raised to $50 in the final stage—and bidding for the $20 bill continued.3 
While this example illustrates how determined the competing bidders were to win, competitive 
escalation differs from and goes beyond the idea that people derive value solely from winning (and 
therefore bid more than the prize is worth; Bühren & Pleßner, 2014; Sheremeta, 2010;Van den Bos et al., 
2008), that anticipated feelings create a negative value for losing (‘loser’s curse;’ Ariely & Simonson, 
2003), or that the value of the prize is overestimated (‘winner’s curse;’ Thaler, 1988). Although 
individuals may value winning or not losing per se and be willing to give up or pay money to win a game, 
we contend that competitive escalation goes beyond c mpetitive arousal by adding escalation of 
commitment. In other words, we expect to conceptually replicate the well-established effects of escalation 
of commitment under competitive arousal.4 Using our dollar auction paradigm to elicit competitive 
escalation, we expect participants to lose more money than participants competing for the same prize in 
an English first-price auction, which lacks the escalation of commitment aspect. An English first-price 
auction is identical to the dollar auction, with the exception that the second-highest bidder does not have 
to pay her bid, meaning that investments do not becom  sunk costs. We propose the following hypothesis:  
                                                      
costs—from conducting the due diligence investigations necessary to bid for an acquisition, for example, or from the 
damage to reputation of losing a bidding war. To mimic these substantial costs without increasing the complexity of 
our experimental paradigm, we decided to define the entire bid of the second-highest bidder as sunk costs. 
3 One might suspect that at some point in the auction the participants anticipated that the “winners” would not be 
forced to pay the full amount bid (which is, indeed, what happened: they did not have to pay the full $2000). 
Therefore, one cannot rule out the possibility thate high bids are at least partly due to participants not taking the 
game seriously—even though they later claimed they did. 
4 A number of experimental settings used to study escalation of commitment entail some form of competition: For 
instance the “radar scrambling device” scenario (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland & Newport, 1991; Garland, 1990) 
mentions a competing firm, or Ku (2008) uses a computer based dollar auction setup. These studies already 
demonstrate that escalation of commitment occurs in competitive situations. However, these studies do not compare 
the severity of the escalation in the competitive situation that is prone to escalation of commitment to a similar 
competitive situation that lacks the escalation aspect, which is an interesting benchmark from our pers ctive. 
Hypothesis 1 reflects our theorizing that the effect of escalation of commitment will beat this benchmark. 
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Hypothesis 1: Individuals face larger losses in a competitive escalation situation than in a similar 
competitive situation without the escalation aspect.  
Learning from Different Types of Experience 
How can individuals learn to address competitive escalation situations? Building on de-biasing 
research (Fischhoff, 1982; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Jung & Young, 2012) and de-escalation 
research (Doerflinger, Martiny-Huenger, & Gollwitzer, 2017; Kirby & Davis, 1998; Kwong & Wong, 
2014; Nathanson et al., 1982; Simonson & Staw, 1992), one of our goals was to test to what extent people 
can learn to avoid competitive escalation. De-biasing competitive positional concerns is hard, even in the 
absence of escalation of commitment. Graf, König, Enders and Hungenberg (2012) tested five different 
de-biasing interventions for such situations. While 31% of their subjects in the control condition chose a 
“competitively irrational option”, even their strongest intervention, a “training in biases” in which 
subjects read quotes from the Harvard Business Review about emotions and social comparisons 
(Malhotra et al., 2008, p. 78 and 80.), only reduce this proportion to 23% (a marginally significant 
effect). Instead of building on these more classical de-biasing interventions, we thus decided to explore 
how different types of experience allow people to learn to avoid competitive escalation. Prior research has 
shown that different types of learning experience result in different learning outcomes (Huber, 1991; 
Levitt & March, 1988). One important distinction is between learning directly from one’s own experience 
(Haselhuhn, Pope, Schweitzer, & Fishman, 2012) and learning indirectly, either from the experience of 
others (Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Gino et al., 2010) or from thinking about the situation and trying to 
mentally simulate the experience. Another distinction is between learning how to address a situation by 
experiencing that specific situation, and learning by transferring from the experience of other, more or 
less similar, situations (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993; Szulanski, 2000).  
Direct experience in exactly the same or a structurally similar task or situation (‘learning by 
doing’) should provide the most powerful learning opp rtunity (e.g., Argote & Todorova, 2007) and 
could thus serve as a benchmark. Direct experience xposes individuals to all aspects of the situation, 
including both ‘hot’ competitive escalation and its destructive consequences. Because the task in which 
11 
 
individuals learn and the task they encounter afterwards are identical, the conditions for knowledge 
transfer are ideal (Thorndike, 1913; Snapp-Childs, Wilson, & Bingham, 2015). Nevertheless, prior 
research has shown that after losing in a competition, people often set themselves a more challenging goal 
(Buser, 2016). Indeed, when Murnighan (2002) repeated his auction experiment in a classroom setting up 
to three times, some students continued to bid and to escalate. The extreme case we described above was 
actually a second auction, following one in which the winning bid for the $20 bill was $54. Murnighan’s 
classroom setting differs in many respects from our minimal competitive escalation paradigm, however. 
In particular, if bidders who have just lost money in the auction learn from their experience, there are only 
two potential bidders left in any group of four participants. Furthermore, prior research suggests tha 
when decision makers experience regret after escalation, they are less likely to escalate again immediat ly 
afterwards (Ku, 2008). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with direct experience in a competitive escalation situation escalate 
less in subsequent competitive escalation situations than individuals without such direct experience. 
Even if individuals have not experienced exactly the same task before, they can potentially 
transfer knowledge acquired from their experience i similar or related tasks (see Blume, Ford, Baldwin, 
& Huang, 2010, for a recent review of the training transfer literature). In what way two tasks need to be 
related so that people can transfer what they have learned from one to the other is largely an open 
question (e.g., Snapp-Childs et al., 2015). However, if two tasks share most features—except one—and 
one cannot learn from one to the other, then this demonstrates that the feature on which they differ is 
crucial. Ordinary competitive situations share most fea ures—except the escalation of commitment-prone 
task structure—with competitive escalation situations. To investigate whether knowledge from 
competitive situations can be transferred to competitiv  escalation situations, we had participants play an 
English first-price auction first and our dollar auction second, using the same computer interface. 
Participants thus gained experience with both the auction situation and the computer interface used to 
enter bids. What is more, they were first exposed to competitive arousal and the auction process without 
the destructive consequences of competitive escalation. Because we contend that competitive escalation is 
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qualitatively different from competition alone, we assume that people need to experience a competitive 
escalation situation that includes these destructive consequences in order to learn to avoid subsequent 
competitive escalation. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals with direct experience in a competitive situation without the escalation 
aspect do not escalate less in a subsequent competitive escalation situation than individuals without s ch 
direct experience  
One form of indirect experience is absorbing the experience of others, a process that has been 
termed vicarious learning (Bandura, 1977; Hoover et al., 2012; Manz & Sims, 1981). It can be especially 
effective in changing behavior, particularly when peo le learn from others’ adverse outcomes or failures 
(Bandura, 1966, 1977; Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Kim & Miner, 2007; Kc, Staats, & Gino, 2013). 
Vicarious learning could go beyond processing the information that the situation could lead to adverse 
outcomes: participants who feel empathy toward those who received the adverse outcomes might also 
affectively experience these consequences vicariously. In a vicarious-learning intervention, we informed 
participants on the final payoffs received by the seven groups in the baseline condition (reported below in 
Experiment 1a, all but one group experienced escalation nd lost money). Note that our vicarious-learning 
intervention does not allow participants to observe the escalation process, but only the outcomes of the 
specific situation they later experienced themselves (making it a conservative test of the effects of 
vicarious learning). Participants received this information before experiencing the auction themselves; 
they could therefore process the information before they made their first decision (avoiding that their 
chosen course of action could bias their information processing; Schulz-Hardt, Vogelgesang, Pfeiffer, 
Mojzisch, Thurow-Kröning, 2010), and bear it in mind when deciding whether to enter the auction or to 
continue bidding and escalating. Specifically, knowing that people typically lose money in this situation 
could shift participants’ reference point for acceptable outcomes, thereby enabling them to accept small
losses from initial bids and in turn to stop bidding before larger losses occur. 
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Hypothesis 4: Individuals with indirect experience of vicariously learning the consequences of a 
competitive escalation situation for others escalate ess in a subsequent competitive escalation situation 
than individuals without such indirect experience. 
Another form of indirect experience can be generated by participants themselves, by mentally 
simulating how a competitive escalation situation might unfold. Prompting participants to engage in this
type of experience comes close to a de-escalation strategy that has been shown to significantly reduce 
escalation of commitment effects (Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Henderson, Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 
2007; Simonson & Staw, 1992): a ‘goal-setting’ intervention based on the mental budgeting approach 
(Heath, 1995; Thaler, 1999). In this intervention, people are asked to think about how the situation might 
develop and to set a limit for their investment (i.e., for bids in the dollar auction). In our setting, we asked 
participants to think about how the dollar auction might unfold and to set themselves a (nonbinding) 
monetary limit, up to which they plan to bid and stay in the auction. As this de-escalation strategy was
designed to facilitate a calculative process aimed at finding a rational point up to which it is sensible to 
invest, it may not be able to counter the ‘hot’ state of competitive arousal assumed to occur in this 
situation. Individuals experiencing a ‘hot‒cold’ empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000) cannot a ticipate 
how their motivation will change from a focus on maximizing absolute outcomes to a desire to win. They 
will therefore exceed their self-imposed limit when they enter the competitive state. As the experienced 
situation feels qualitatively different from the situation imagined in a ‘cold’ state, plans and strategies 
devised for the imagined situation will appear to be irrelevant. We therefore propose the following 
alternative hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals with indirect experience of mentally simulating how the competitive 
escalation situation will unfold and setting oneself an investment limit do not escalate less in a subsequent 




From the Dollar Auction to the Minimal Dollar Auction Paradigm 
Following the call in Prentice and Miller (1992) to create minimal conditions for studying effects 
in controlled environments, we sought to develop a dollar auction paradigm that was as close to minimal 
as possible. A first advantage is that such conditions reduce the number of potential confounds and 
eliminate alternative explanations. This allows researchers to make more precise causal attributions and to 
differentiate between (competing) theoretical explanations, thereby increasing internal validity. A second 
advantage is that a minimal paradigm increases external validity: In some studies, features are added to 
bolster the strength of an effect, but these featurs a e often not part of the environment in which the 
effect naturally occurs. In a minimal paradigm, such features are removed. Third, using a minimal 
paradigm allows us to gauge the robustness of the phenomenon under investigation: A phenomenon that 
can be observed with only a small number of preconditi s is more robust than one that requires more 
conditions to be met. The $2000 bid for a $20 bill is impressive, but the setting of Murnighan’s (2002) 
class auction was not minimal. Several features of it, which might not necessarily be present in 
organizational settings, may have amplified the escalation or may limit the generalizability of findings: a 
large crowd of spectators (Beeler & Hunton, 1997), identifiability of and familiarity between players 
(Haran & Ritov, 2014), the outgoing and active atmosphere of the classroom game, and rules for possible 
increments in bid sizes.  
In our minimal dollar auction paradigm, participants played a variant of the dollar auction in 
which a fixed amount of money (in Experiment 1: CHF 10, approximately USD 10.50 or 9 EUR at the 
time of the study, in Experiment 2 and 3: 0.50 USD, 0.42 EUR at the time of the study) were auctioned 
off to the highest bidder, and both the highest and the second-highest bidder had to pay their respective 
bids. We propose that competition is destructive if the winner, the highest bidder in the auction, loses 
money. The game was played in small groups of four (in the laboratory) or two (in the online setting) 
participants in a quiet setting without spectators and with guaranteed anonymity. Furthermore, we relaxed 
the rules on minimum and maximum increments for bidding, allowing all bids larger than the current bid
15 
 
(that were multiples of CHF 0.25 (approximately USD 0.26 or 0.22 EUR) in Experiment 1 or multiples of 
0.02 USD in Experiment 2 and 3).  
In contrast to actors in organizational contexts, participants in laboratory settings have limited 
opportunities to learn about the task or the structure of the environment. We therefore ensured that every 
participant correctly understood the workings of the minimal dollar auction before it began. Detailed 
experimental instructions explained every step of the auction process, and participants had to pass a 
comprehension check before being allowed to take part in the auction. In all experiments, sample sizes 
were determined in advance. We report all studies w conducted in this line of research.  
Experiment 1a: Learning from Direct Experience (Students) 
The primary purpose of Experiment 1a was to test Hypotheses 1‒3. Specifically, we tested 
whether the amount bid in the minimal dollar auction paradigm exceeded the amount bid in an English 
first-price auction (H1). In addition, we examined whether providing people with the opportunity to gain 
direct experience in a competitive escalation situation (H2) and in a competitive situation that lacked the 
escalation aspect (H3) can serve as an intervention, preparing participants to avoid competitive escalation 
and the resulting losses in a subsequent competitive escalation situation.  
Method 
Participants. We used the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greine , 2015) to recruit 56 
students (20 female and 36 male; mean age: 21.4 years) from a large participant pool at two large Swiss 
universities. The experiment took place in a computer lab, where blinds between computers ensured that 
participants could see only their own screen. The experiment was embedded in a 90-minute session 
comprising various economic games and questionnaires with performance-contingent payments. We 
report all measures and manipulations that are relevant for this study; no participants were excluded. 
Sample size was determined before any data analysis. The computer interface was specifically 
programmed for this experiment. Participants’ expected (average) reimbursement was approximately 
CHF 38.00 (approximately 40 USD / 35 EUR) for the entir  session, which was in line with the typical 
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hourly rate in this lab. Participants could potentially lose all money earned, except for a minimum 
payment of CHF 3.00 (approximately 2.85 USD or 2.60 EUR). It can therefore be assumed that, up to the 
expected total earnings, they perceived the potential losses in the minimal dollar-auction as consequential. 
Participants were randomly assigned to groups of four, with between two and four groups taking part pe 
session. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to two between-subjects conditions: in the ‘first-
price auction’ condition, they played a first-price auction and then the dollar auction; in the ‘repeated 
dollar auction’ condition, they played the dollar auction twice. Participants were first familiarized with the 
rules and details of the interface. The instructions for the first-price auction emphasized that only the 
highest bidder would have to pay his bid and would receive the prize of CHF 10.00. The instructions for 
the dollar auction emphasized that both the highest bidder and the second-highest bidder would have to 
pay their respective bids, but that only the highest bidder would receive the CHF 10.00. Participants had
to correctly answer several questions checking their understanding of the task and the interface before 
entering the auction. 
Participants placed bids by entering their desired bid size, either directly through an input box or 
through two sets of buttons (corresponding to CHF 0.25 and CHF 0.50 step-size increases and decreases). 
Bids were made by pressing a ‘submit’ button. The mini um possible bid was CHF 0.25 above the 
current highest bid. There was no maximum bid enforced. All players were immediately informed about 
bids by other players, and minimum bid amounts were adjusted after each new bid. A decreasing timer 
bar indicated the time remaining for new bids and was refilled after each new bid. The auction ended 
when the timer reached zero. Participants were informed that the speed of the timer bar could increase 
over the course of the auction.5 
After finishing the first auction, participants were informed about the second auction: Participants 
in the ‘first-price auction’ condition were introduced to the dollar auction and answered the corresponding 
                                                      
5 The speed of the timer bar started to increase only when a (very high) threshold for a bid value was reached. 
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control questions. Participants in the ‘repeated dollar auction’ condition were shown only a summary of 
the auction’s rules. 
Results 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 summarizes means, medians, and standard deviations for the highest and second-highest 
bids across experimental conditions. Because of the relatively small number of independent observations 
and because these variables were not normally distributed, we used nonparametric statistical tests. When 
playing the dollar auction as first auction, 86% of participants placed a bid at some point in the auction, 
and 39% placed a bid higher than CHF 10.00. In six of the seven groups, the highest bid surpassed CHF 
10.00. Thus, the minimal dollar auction paradigm was sufficient to elicit competitive escalation. Even the 
winners of the auction lost on average CHF 4.64. 
Participants who played a first-price auction befor the dollar auction had lower highest bids 
(Mann‒Whitney U-test: U = 7.50, = = 7, exact p = .026, two-tailed, r = 0.58) and lower second-
highest bids (U = 7.00, = = 7, exact p = .026, two-tailed, r = 0.60) in that auction, although two 
participants escalated even in the first-price auction, overbidding the prize by CHF 0.50 and CHF 0.25, 
respectively. Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 1: Participants bid less and therefore lost less money 
in the first-price auction than in the dollar auction, illustrating that our minimal dollar auction paradigm 
was sufficient to elicit competitive escalation. Figure 1 illustrates how the bidding unfolded in the dollar 
auction paradigm. In particular, it shows how the two highest bidders surpassed the value of the prizeof 
CHF 10.00 in small increments, with both ending up paying more than CHF 20.00. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Participants who played the dollar auction a second time engaged in less competitive escalation: 
Although 79% of them placed a bid at some point in the second auction, the highest bid (not the second-
highest bid) now surpassed CHF 10.00 in only one of the seven groups. Relative to the first dollar 
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auction, there was a significant difference in both highest bids (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: n = 7, z = 
−2.03, exact p = .043, two-tailed, r = 0.77) and second-highest bids (n = 7, z = −2.03, exact p = .042, two-
tailed, r = 0.77). Participants on average won CHF 0.71. Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 2: 
Participants did not bid more than CHF 10.00 in the second dollar auction. Experiencing a competitive 
escalation situation worked as an intervention and enabled individuals to avoid the destructive 
consequences of a subsequent escalation situation 
In contrast, when playing the first-price auction before, 89% of participants placed a bid at some 
point in the dollar auction, and 36% placed a bid higher than CHF 10.00. In five of the seven groups, the 
highest bid surpassed CHF 10.00. We found no significa t difference in highest bids (U = 24.00,  = 
= 7, exact p = 1, two-tailed, r = 0.02) or second-highest bids (U = 22.50,  = = 7, exact p = .805, 
two-tailed, r = 0.07) between participants who played the first-pice auction before playing the dollar 
auction and participants who played the dollar auction first. Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 3: 
Even after participants had played a first-price auction, they still escalated their bidding in the minimal 
dollar auction paradigm. 
Experiment 1b: Learning from Direct Experience (Executives) 
Because research on competitive escalation should ultimately inform managers and policy 
makers, it is important to test the research paradigms with samples of participants who are as similar as 
possible to the population of decision makers to which we want to generalize. The purpose of Experiment 
1b was thus to underline the external validity of the paradigm by replicating some of the results from 
Experiment 1a with experienced executives, who are typically embedded in competitive environments 
(Malhotra et al., 2008; Garcia & Tor, 2007). Prior research provided evidence that the level of managerial 
training is related to decreased tendencies for escalating commitment outside of competitive situations 
(Fennema & Perkins, 2008). Testing how competitive escalation unfolds in a sample of actual managers 




Participants. The experiment was run in the context of a course on negotiation and decision 
making in the executive MBA program of a large Swiss university, attended by 29 executives (5 female 
and 24 male; mean age: 38.1 years). The managers had at least 7 years of professional experience, 63% 
had more than 10 years, and 30% had more than 14 years of experience. The experiment was embedded 
in a 50-minute session comprising various other games and questionnaires with performance-contingent 
payments. We report all measures and manipulations hat are relevant for this study; no participants were 
excluded. Sample size was determined before any data analysis. Participants’ expected (average) 
reimbursement for the entire session was approximately CHF 22.00. 
Procedure. For the dollar auction, participants were randomly assigned to groups of four (leaving 
one manager, who had to assume the role of an observer), and these seven groups were tested 
simultaneously. The procedure was identical to that for Experiment 1a, except that all participants played 
the dollar auction twice (none played a first-price auction). The experiment took place in four computer 
labs reserved for the class, and participants were distributed over the labs to make sure that players could 
not see the screens of other group members. 
Results 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 summarizes means, medians, and standard deviations for the highest and second-highest 
bids across experimental conditions. Approximately 82% of participants placed at least one bid, and 39%
of participants (in four of the seven groups) placed a bid higher than CHF 10.00. Thus, we found that 
competitive escalation occurs frequently even in a sample of experienced executives, replicating the 
results of Experiment 1a. While comparisons across different samples should be interpreted with caution, 
the results of the executive sample and the previously observed student sample playing the dollar auction 
as first auction did not differ notably: we found no significant difference in highest bids (U = 25.00, = 
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= 7, exact p = 1, two-tailed, r = 0.02) or second-highest bids (U = 25.00, = = 7, exact p = 1, two-
tailed, r = 0.02). On average, participants lost CHF 5.07.  
Like the students in Experiment 1a, executives who played the dollar auction a second time 
engaged less in competitive escalation: 75% of them placed a bid at some point in the second auction, 
which was not significantly fewer than in the first dollar auction (z = −.65, p = .51), but only 18% of 
participants (in three of the seven groups) overbid the prize. There was a significant difference in highest 
bids (n = 7, z = −2.03, p = .043, two-tailed, r = 0.77) and second-highest bids (n = 7, z = −2.21, p = .027, 
two-tailed, r = 0.83) between the first and the second auction. Participants on average lost CHF 1.18.  
In sum, the level of competitive escalation among experienced executives was similar to the level 
we found among students in Experiment 1a. This underli es the paradigm’s external validity and bolster 
our confidence in generalizing our results to executives.  
Experiment 1c: Learning from Indirect Experience 
The purpose of Experiment 1c was to test Hypotheses 4 and 5. In particular, we investigated 
whether individuals could learn to address competitiv  escalation situations from two types of indirect 
experience: vicarious learning and mental simulation of the situation using a ‘goal-setting’ interventio . 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 56 students (23 female and 33 male; mean age 21 years) at a large 
Swiss university from the same participant pool as in Experiment 1a. The experiment was again 
embedded in a 90-minute session comprising various economic games and questionnaires, with an 
expected total reimbursement of about CHF 38.00 and a guaranteed minimum payment of CHF 3.00. We 
report all measures and manipulations that are relevant for this study, no participants were excluded. 
Sample size was determined before any data analysis. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions: goal setting 
and vicarious learning. With the exception of these int rventions, the procedure in Experiment 1c was the 
same as in Experiment 1a. Participants first learned th  rules of the auction and were introduced to the 
interface. After a comprehension check, they were presented with the condition-specific intervention.  
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In the goal-setting condition, participants were asked to imagine the course of the auction and to 
set a limit: the maximum amount they were willing to bid. The limit was prominently displayed during 
the auction but not automatically enforced. As soon as a participant exceeded his limit, it was highlighted 
in red and a warning was shown below it.  
In the vicarious-learning condition, participants were presented with the auction results for the 
seven groups in Experiment 1a. In particular, they w re informed that the mean highest bid for these 
groups was CHF 13.00 and that the mean second-highest bid was CHF 11.25. In addition, they saw a 
detailed table containing the highest, second-highest, and third-highest bids, as well as the corresponding 
payoffs for the highest, second-highest, and third-ghest bidders. Only one of these bidders had a 
positive payoff. To ensure that participants read an  understood this information, we required them to 
answer several control questions correctly before beginning the auction. Participants in the vicarious-
learning condition played a second auction immediatly after the first. The purpose of this second auction 
was to investigate whether first-hand learning had an additional effect on escalatory behavior above and 
beyond vicarious learning. There was no second auction in the goal-setting condition. 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes means, medians, and standard deviations for the highest and second-highest 
bids across experimental conditions. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Vicarious learning. In the vicarious-learning condition, 82% of participants placed a bid at some 
point in the auction, but only 7% of participants (in one of the seven groups) placed a bid higher than
CHF 10.00. The percentage of participants placing a bid was not significantly lower than in the dollar 
auction without intervention in Experiment 1a (z = 0.36, p = .72). Comparison with the first dollar auction 
reported in Experiment 1a revealed a significant difference in highest bids (U = 3.50, = = 7, exact p 
= .004, two-tailed, r = 0.72) and in second-highest bids (U = 4.00, = = 7, exact p = .007, two-tailed, r
= 0.70). Participants in the vicarious-learning condition on average lost CHF 0.94. However, the winners 
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of the auction on average won CHF 2.89. Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 4: Competitive 
escalation was reduced by presenting participants with the outcomes of previously participating groups.  
When playing the auction a second time (without repetition of the vicarious-learning 
manipulation), 71% of participants in the vicarious-learning condition placed a bid at some point in the 
auction. This was not significantly different from when playing the auction the first time in the vicar ous-
learning condition (z = .95, p = .34). However, the highest bid did not surpass CHF 10.00 in any of the 
seven groups. We found a significant difference in highest bids (n = 7, z = −2.02, p = .043, two-tailed, r = 
0.76) and second-highest bids (n = 7, z = −2.37, p = .018, two-tailed, r = 0.89) between the first and the 
second auction. Participants on average won CHF 1.10.  
We found no significant difference between the results for the second dollar auctions in the 
vicarious-learning treatment and in Experiment 1a, in either highest (U = 13.00,  = = 7, exact p = 
.165, two-tailed, r = 0.40) or second-highest bids (U = 15.00, = = 7, exact p = .259, two-tailed, r = 
0.33). Participants in the second dollar auction after the vicarious-learning intervention won on averge 
CHF 0.30 more than participants in the second dollar auction in Experiment 1a. 
Goal setting. Of the 28 participants in the goal-setting condition, 24 set themselves a limit of 
CHF 10.00 or below; the remaining 4 participants (14%) set themselves a higher limit. However, 11 of 
the 28 players (39%) bid more than their limit. In the goal-setting condition, 82% of participants placed a 
bid at some point in the auction. This percentage of participants was not significantly different from that 
observed in the dollar auction without intervention in Experiment 1a (z = .36, p = .72). Approximately 
one third (32%) of the participants (in five of the s ven groups) placed a bid higher than CHF 10.00. 
Participants on average lost CHF 12.04.6  
Comparing the highest and second-highest bids with those observed in the first dollar auction 
with the student sample in Experiment 1a revealed no significant differences (highest bids: U = 25.50, 
                                                      
6 The more extreme results were driven by an outlier: One of the auctions escalated up to a highest bid of 
CHF 111.00. Excluding that auction, the mean highest bid was CHF 16.42 (SD = CHF 14.94), and the median was 
CHF 11.50. The mean second-highest bid was CHF 14.42 (SD = CHF 16.00) and the median was CHF 10.50. 
Participants still lost CHF 4.81 on average, and even the winners of the auction lost CHF 6.41 on averg . 
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=  = 7, exact p = .90, two-tailed, r = 0.03; second-highest bids: U = 25.00, = = 7, exact p = 1, 
two-tailed, r = 0.02). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 5: Competitive escalation did occur in the 
minimal dollar auction paradigm, even when participants set themselves a limit before entering the 
auction.  
Discussion Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we demonstrated that our minimal dollar auction paradigm was sufficient to 
elicit competitive escalation, and we found initial support for Hypotheses 1-5. These results are consiste t 
with our theorizing about the ‘hot-cold’ empathy gap: the vicarious-learning intervention succeeded at 
reducing competitive escalation. We propose that it provided participants with a reason not to enter th  
‘hot’ state and the escalatory spiral in the first place. Although vicarious learning helped to reduce 
escalation in the dollar auction, having experienced th  dollar auction at first hand reduced escalation 
even further. Learning from both the vicarious-learning intervention and from experience of the dollar 
auction did not have a stronger effect than first-hand learning (from experiencing the dollar auction) 
alone. This finding is in line with recent evidence from the effects of different types of experience on 
investment decisions: Lejarraga, Woike and Hertwig (2016) showed that experience in investing in funds 
allows for a different kind of learning than analyzing the fund’s past performance without investing.  
In contrast to the vicarious learning intervention, a d in addition, consistent with the literature on 
‘hot‒cold’ empathy gaps, the goal-setting intervention, which has previously succeeded in averting 
escalation of commitment (Heath, 1995; Simonson & Staw, 1992), did not prevent competitive escalation 
in the minimal dollar auction paradigm. In fact, escalation was at least as strong—and potentially even 
stronger—for participants who set themselves a limit before the auction. It is possible that setting a limit 
in fact gave participants a reason to continue beyond their initial bids: Because a limit is set, the auction 
seems less dangerous, and it may appear more rational to continue bidding. Once engaged in the auction 
and having passed the stage of introductory bids, participants entered the ‘hot’ state, which they could not 
anticipate when setting their limit in the ‘cold’ state, and they thus failed to respect their own limit. 
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Experiment 2: Testing the Minimal Dollar Auction Paradigm in an Online Setting, and Unpacking 
the Goal Setting Intervention 
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to adapt and test our minimal dollar auction paradigm in 
an online setting. Observing competitive escalation among online participants would provide additional 
evidence for the robustness of the phenomenon. At the same time, the online setting significantly reduces 
the monetary costs for each observation (allowing for future research with larger sample sizes): We 
auctioned off USD 0.50. The second purpose of Experiment 2 was to unpack the goal setting intervention. 
Specifically, we differentiated between the indirect xperience of merely mentally simulating how the 
competitive escalation situation might unfold (without setting oneself a limit) and setting oneself a limit 
(which of course similarly requires to mentally simulate how the auction might unfold). Moreover, we 
intended to test whether we can increase the effectiveness of the mental simulation by prompting 
participants to think about the key stage in the competitive escalation process, in which one party is 
forced to either drop out or to bid more than the value of the prize. Specifically, we prompted them to 
imagine that they bid 48 cents for a price of 50 cents in the dollar auction paradigm and that their 
opponent, in turn, bid 50 cents, and asked them what they would do in this situation (see Open Materials 
for more details). This new intervention was specifically designed to examine the potential concern that 
the dollar auction is a mere “parlor trick”, which only works because people do not anticipate the 
possibility that the winner of the auction can lose money. Players make bids of 50 cents to avoid a cert in 
loss of 46 cents (in reaction to a counterbid of 48 cents) and no player can win money from this critical 
bid on. Subscribers to the “dollar auction is a parlor t ick” idea typically believe that if only people 
considered and understood this crucial moment before the game, they would not lose money in the 
auction. Our intervention puts this idea to a direct t st by confronting participants with the critical stage in 
the auction process.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 193 US based participants (79 male, 114 female; mean age 36 years) 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This experiment was embedded in a longer collection of 
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tasks. We report all measures and manipulations that are relevant for this study; no participants were 
excluded7.  
Procedure. We set up Experiment 2 as an online study to allow for larger sample sizes. For 
feasibility reasons, we adapted our minimal dollar auction paradigm such that each participant plays 
against a computer player that is programmed based on the behavior of earlier participants8. We made this 
fully transparent to participants, the experiment did not involve any deception. Playing against simulated 
others serves a conservative test for competitive escalation, as one could argue that simulated others 
inspire less rivalry than non-simulated others, so if we nevertheless observe competitive escalation, his 
underlines the phenomenon’s robustness. All participants were endowed with a bonus of USD 1.20 when 
entering the task, which they could potentially lose. We auctioned off USD 0.50. Participants placed bids
by clicking on one of 5 buttons, which increased the currently highest bid by 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 cents, 
respectively.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four c nditions: baseline, goal setting, mental 
simulation of the escalation in general, nd mental simulation of the escalation point. As in Experiment 1, 
participants were first familiarized with the rules and details of the interface. In the goal setting condition, 
participants were asked to state the maximum amount they were willing to bid for the 50 cents price in the 
dollar auction, while the instructions emphasized that his limit would not be enforced but that 
participants should keep it in mind. In the mental simulation of the escalation in general condition, 
                                                      
7 In the beginning of this larger collection of tasks, some participants were excluded because they fail d ttention 
checks or due to double participation. Once participants entered the auction task, they were assigned to conditions, 
and none of these participants were excluded. Another group of participants also responded to a variant of the 
dynamic chicken game we introduce in Experiment 3. Due to technical problems and unusually high attrition rate in 
this condition (many participants skipped this time-consuming condition, as it was framed as voluntary, nd 
skipping the task did not affect participants’ fixed and bonus payment for the rest of the experiment), their results 
became uninterpretable, and we will not report them re. However, all results would be fully consistent with our 
theorizing and the results of Experiment 3, which do not suffer from these problems.  
8 Participants were made aware that the computer player’s responses are modeled after the behavior of earlier 
participants. The computer player was bidding in 2 cent increments until the bidding reached 54 cents, and then 
continued in 4 cents increments until the bidding reached 110 cents. At this point the computer player would drop 
out. In the rare situation that the participant would not make any bid for 18 seconds upon starting the auction, the 




participants were asked tothink about how the auction unfolds and write a short description. In the mental 
simulation of the escalation point condition, participants were asked to imagine thatey bid 48 cents and 
the other player reacted by bidding 50 cents. They w re asked to either indicate that they would bid more 
than 52 cents, would bid 52 cents but then stop, or stop now and pay the 48 cents. 
Results  
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 summarizes means, medians, and standard deviations for the highest bids across the 
different conditions9, as well as the percentage of participants who placed a bid at all, who placed a bid 
above 50 cents, and the percentage of participants who “won” the auction (the simulated player stopped 
bidding after 110 cents)10.  
Participants in the baseline condition bid significantly more than 50 cents for the price of 50 cents 
(M = 64.6, SEM = 4.96, t(49) = 2.95, p = .005). This validates the online version of the dollar auction 
paradigm. Supporting H5, participants with indirect xperience of mentally simulating how the 
competitive escalation situation would unfold and setting themselves a limit (goal-setting condition) did
not escalate significantly less in a subsequent competitive escalation situation (M = 55.5, SEM = 5.05) 
than participants without such an indirect experience (t(89) = 1.27, p = .21, d = 0.27). While they bid 
slightly (but not significantly) less, a majority of limit setters bid beyond their limit (73%), and 39% bid 
                                                      
9 See Appendix for a full regression table. 
10 Experiment 2 was also used as an opportunity to explore the affective nature of the situation, and, to the extent 
that this is possible using a retrospective self-repo t measure, to bolster the assumption that competitive escalation is 
indeed driven by competitive arousal. To do so, we asked participants how they had felt during the game 
immediately after the first auction. Participants re ponded on a five-point scale to 20 items of the PANAS (Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988). While participants were explicitly asked to report their affect during the situation, we can 
of course not exclude the possibility that the payoff they received could spill over into their reported affect, such that 
high bids, which imply high losses, would result in negative affect (examples for negative affect items are: 
distressed, upset, irritable and jittery). Thus, while such a spillover account would predict a correlation between 
losses and negative affect, finding evidence for a correlation between escalation (high bids) and positive affect 
(examples for positive affect items are: excited, strong, enthusiastic and determined) would be suggestive of the 
association between competitive escalation and arous l. We first aggregated both the negative affect it ms and the 
positive affect items from the PANAS into a scale (Cronbach’s alpha was .82 and .86, respectively), and then 
regressed them on participant’s highest bid, while controlling for the experimental condition. The analysis reveals a 
significant relationship between positive affect and the size of the highest bid (B = 6.96, SE = 2.65, p = .009), while 
the relationship between negative affect and the siz  of the highest bid does not reach statistical significance (B = 
4.71, SE = 3.24, p = .148).  
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beyond 50 cents. A post hoc power analysis revealed that we would need a larger sample of N= 200 per 
condition to detect an effect of this size with adequate power and an alpha of 0.05 (i.e., our a priori p wer 
estimation for this new paradigm was too optimistic). We test this hypothesis in Experiment 3 with 
adequate power. Mentally simulating the escalation in general (without limit setting) and mentally 
simulating the key escalation point yielded similar, if not worse results (see Table 4).  
Discussion  
In Experiment 2, we successfully adapted our minimal dollar auction paradigm to an online 
setting and were able to instill competitive escalation in MTurk participants, when each participant was 
bidding one-to-one against a computer player. We also found additional evidence supporting H5: indirect 
experience through mental simulation and setting oneself a limit does not prevent subsequent competitiv  
escalation. Our results furthermore illustrate thatit does not matter much whether the mental simulation is 
combined with the goal setting instructions or not, or whether participants are explicitly prompted to think 
about the escalation point at which the auction turs into a game in which both players lose money. By 
prompting participants to think about this escalation point, we could rule out the concern that the dollar 
auction is a mere “parlor trick” that, once people think about it, nobody would fall for.  
Experiment 3: Replicating and Extending the Main Results with a Larger Sample 
The main purpose of Experiment 3 was to replicate our results from Experiment 1 with a larger 
sample and to extend them in several ways. First, we intended to extend H1 by showing that a competitiv  
escalation situation led to larger losses than a similar competitive situation without the escalation aspect–
regardless of whether people win or lose money in this first escalation situation. Second, we intended to 
expand upon H2, showing that direct experience in a competitive escalation situation subsequently 
reduces competitive escalation even in a different, but structurally similar, escalation situation. Third, we 
intended to replicate H3 by showing that direct experience in a competitive situation without the 
escalation aspect does not reduce escalation in a subsequent competitive escalation situation. Fourth, we 
intended to replicate H4, showing that the indirect experience of vicariously learning the consequences of 
a competitive escalation situation for others reducs subsequent competitive escalation. Fifth, we intended 
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to replicate H5, showing that the indirect experience of mentally simulating how the competitive 
escalation situation will unfold, and setting oneself a limit does not reduce competitive escalation.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 1,001 US-based participants (56.1% femal ; mean age of 35 years) 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This experiment was embedded in a longer collection of tasks. We 
report all measures and manipulations that are relevant for this study; no participants were excluded at the 
data analysis stage (before they could enter the study, we automatically excluded people who participated 
in Experiment 2 and participants with an IP address that was already used by another participant, as well 
as people from outside the US).  
Procedure. We set up Experiment 3 as an online study to allow for larger sample sizes, using the 
paradigm we developed in Experiment 2. All participants were endowed with a bonus of USD 1.20 when 
entering the task, which they could potentially lose. We auctioned off 50 cents. Participants placed bids 
by clicking on one of five buttons, which increased the currently highest bid by 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 cents, 
respectively.  
In addition to the dollar auction, we developed a second, structurally similar competitive 
escalation situation: a dynamic chicken game. As in the dollar auction, the winner in this game received 
50 cents. In contrast to the dollar auction, both participants automatically and simultaneously increased 
their bid by 5 cents for every 5 seconds they stayed in the game. They could stop bidding by stepping out 
of the game at any time, achieved by clicking on the only available button on the page. The player who
remained in the game longer won the 50 cents. This dynamic chicken game is structurally similar to the
dollar auction, once one considers the cost of staying in the game as a bid for the money. In both games 
the highest and the second highest bidder have to pay their respective bid, while only the highest bidder 
receives the prize. The only difference is that in the dynamic chicken game, participants automatically 
place a bid in every time period in which they do not actively end the game, whereas in the dollar auction 
participants automatically ended the game when they did not actively place a bid. When we tested H2 in 
Experiment 1, we examined the effect of direct experience in a competitive escalation situation on 
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participants’ subsequent behavior in exactly the same competitive escalation situation. As a more 
powerful test, in Experiment 3, we investigate the eff ct of direct experience in a competitive escalation 
situation on participants’ subsequent behavior in a different, but structurally similar competitive 
escalation situation, the dynamic chicken game. Specifically, participants in the baseline condition played 
this dynamic chicken game after they had finished the dollar auction. We compare their escalation 
behavior to participants in another condition, who only played the dynamic chicken game. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: baseline (followed by the dynamic 
chicken game), first-price auction, vicarious learning, goal setting, and dynamic chicken game only. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were first familiarized with the rules and details of the interface. In the 
baseline condition, participants first played the dollar auction. After finishing the dollar auction (in the 
baseline condition), they were informed that they would receive an additional bonus to refill their bonus 
account (unless their bonus account still contained th  full USD 1.20), so that they would start the 
dynamic chicken game with exactly USD 1.20 (without this additional bonus, participants who escalated 
and thus lost money in the dollar auction might have had less money left to lose). Having less bonus 
money left could potentially add a confound in testing H2, as experience in the first competitive 
escalation situation would reduce people’s bonus, and thus making them potentially more conservative 
afterwards. By resetting the bonus amount (to the participant’s unexpected advantage), we avoid any such
income effects. If anything, we could see a “house-money effect”, in which people would gamble more 
with the additional bonus, which would make it harder for us to find support for H2. 
 In the first-price auction condition, participants first played a first-price auction for 50 cents 
against a computer player and afterwards played a doll r auction for 50 cents. To explore to what extent 
participant’s behavior in the dollar auction depends on whether they won the prize in the first-prize 
auction, participants were randomly assigned to a cmputer player that bid either until 46 cents or until 50 
cents (of course participants could stop bidding before that point in both conditions)11. In the vicarious 
                                                      
11 As both bidding strategies corresponded to the behavior of a sizable percentage of participants in Experiment 1, 
this could be implemented without deception.  
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learning condition, participants were presented with the auction results of participants in the baseline 
condition of Experiment 2. In particular, they were informed about the results of the 100 players in 
Experiment 2 (50 MTurk participants and 50 computer players). Specifically, they were informed how 
many of these players won or lost money after playing their bids, and about the mean financial results for 
the highest and second-highest bidders (see the Open Materials for details). In the goal setting condition, 
participants were asked to state the maximum amount they were willing to bid for the 50 cents price in the 
dollar auction, while the instructions emphasized that his limit would not be enforced but that 
participants should keep it in mind. In the dynamic chicken game only condition, participants played only 
the dynamic chicken game.  
Results  
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 summarizes means, medians, and standard deviations for the highest bids across the 
different conditions12, as well as the percentage of participants who placed a bid at all, who placed a bid 
above 50 cents, and the percentage of participants who “won” the auction (the simulated player escalated 
until 110 cents)13. Figure 2a depicts the distributions of bids in the different conditions, and Figure 2b 
displays the cumulative probability of staying in the auction as a function of bid size. 
What first stands out is that across all conditions, we see less escalation than in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. For instance, in the baseline condition, the average highest bid is 42.2 cents, and thus 
significantly below the price of 50 cents ((194) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 0.48). Nevertheless, 95% of the 
                                                      
12 See Appendix for a full regression table. 
13 In Experiment 3, we aimed at replicating the association between positive affect and escalation we found in 
Experiment 2. Immediately after the first auction, participants responded about how they had felt during the game to 
20 items of the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). We again found a positive association between affect 
levels and the size of participants’ bids. We again aggregated items into a positive and a negative scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha is .90 and .91, respectively), and then regressed them on participants’ highest bids, while controlling for the 
experimental condition. Both positive affect (B = 7.74, SEM = 1.37, p < .001) and—to a weaker degree—negative 
affect (B = 3.99, SEM = 1.62, p = .01) are significantly associated with higher bids.  
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participants in this condition lost money, on averag  36.5 cents, illustrating that there is still potential for 
the interventions to prevent losses. While we expected ompetitive escalation to be weaker when playing 
against computer players on the Internet than against other people in the lab, it is harder to make sense of 
the differences between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. One potential explanation would be that the 
auction in Experiment 2 was embedded in a longer battery of other tasks so that the bonus money 
participants could potentially lose made up a smaller percentage of their total earnings from the battery of 
tasks. In contrast, Experiment 3 was shorter, potentially making the additional bonus to be perceived as 
more important for their overall earnings, and thereby making participants more cautious to risk it in the 
auction game. As our main focus was whether the diff rent interventions help reducing competitive 
escalation, we were more interested in the relative diff rences between conditions than in the absolute 
level of escalation in the paradigm. Therefore, let us urn now to testing our hypotheses.  
Supporting H1, participants faced significantly larger losses in the competitive escalation 
situation (M = -36.5, SEM = 1.66) than in a similar situation without the escalation aspect, where the 
average result is slightly positive (M = 0.6, SEM = 0.08, t(194.9) = 22.03, p < .001, d = 2.27). The 
difference in highest bids, however, is not statistically significant (dollar auction: M = 42.15, SEM = 2.27, 
first-price auction: M = 37.7, SEM = 1, Welch’s t(262.1) = 1.73, p = .08, d = 0.18) and should be 
interpreted carefully: When the computer player bid until 46 cents, participants bid less (but not 
significantly less) than when the computer player bid until 50 cents, illustrating that this result is 
somewhat influenced by the strategy of the computer player. 
Supporting H2, participants with direct experience in a competitive escalation situation escalated 
less in a subsequent competitive escalation situation (highest bid in the dynamic chicken game: M = 43.5, 
SEM = 3.06 in the baseline condition, and M = 60.7, SEM = 2.71 in the chicken game only condition, 
t(394) = 4.20, p < .001, d = 0.42). Supporting H3, participants with direct exp rience in a competitive 
escalation situation without the escalation aspect did not escalate less in a subsequent competitive 
escalation situation (M = 54.4, SEM = 2.81) than participants without such an experience—rather they 
escalated more (baseline: M = 42.2, SEM = 2.81, t(401) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 0.33). In particular, 
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participants who played the first-price auction against a computer who stopped bidding at 46 cents drive 
this result, as they were bidding significantly more (M = 59.9, SEM = 3.7) than participants who played 
the first-price auction against a computer player who stopped bidding at 50 cents (M = 48.8, SEM = 4.2, 
t(206) = 1.99, p = .048, d = 0.27). Even in this case, we can reject the hypothesis that direct experience in 
a competitive situation without the escalation aspect would reduce escalation by one cent or more (p = 
.04, following the TOST procedure, Lakens, 2017).  
Supporting H4, participants with indirect experienc of vicariously learning the consequences of 
a competitive escalation situation escalated less (M = 34.0, SEM = 2.29) in a subsequent competitive 
escalation situation than other participants withou such indirect experience (t(393) = 2.47, p = .01, d = 
0.24). Supporting H5, participants who mentally simulated how the competitive escalation situation 
would unfold and set themselves a limit did not escalate significantly less in a subsequent competitiv 
escalation situation (M = 43, SEM = 2.42) than participants without such an indirect experience (t 389) = 
0.25, p = .80, d = 0.03). While we cannot reject the hypothesis that limi  setting could have reduced 
competitive escalation by one cent (p = .29), equivalence testing following the TOST procedure revealed 
that we can reject the hypothesis that it reduced competitive escalation by five cents or more (p = .04). A 
majority (61%) of limit setters bid beyond their limit.  
Finally, our data also allows us to analyze whether e were any gender differences in 
competitive escalation: When we regress participants’ highest bid on a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
women and 0 otherwise (and exclude the one person that answered the gender question with “other”), 
while controlling for experimental condition, we find no evidence for gender differences (B = 1.61, SE = 
2.00, p = .42). This null-result is robust against alternative specifications, for instance when including an 
interaction of gender with experimental conditions. 
Discussion  
In Experiment 3, we successfully replicated our results from Experiments 1 and 2, and thereby 
strengthened the support for our hypotheses, while ruling out potential concerns about small sample siz s 
and limited statistical power. One observation we want to highlight is that in the vicarious learning 
33 
 
condition, there is (almost) a gap between those bidders who stop at approximately 50 cents and those 
who bid all the way up to 110 cents (where they might only stop because they win the auction) – almost 
nobody stops bidding in between. If this interventio  works particularly well for one type of participants, 
for those who would at some point be willing to let go and accept their losses, and not so much for 
another type of participants, those who are going to stick it out until the end, this could be an interesting 
starting point for future research that aims to tailor interventions to “behavioral types” for whom they 
might work most effectively. 
General Discussion 
In our experiments, experienced managers, students and MTurk participants consistently engaged 
in competitive escalation: They literally ended up paying more than CHF 10.00 for CHF 10.00 or USD 
0.50 for USD 0.50. We demonstrated that competitive escalation can arise when time pressure and 
rivalry—situational features associated with competitiv  arousal—coincide with a payoff structure prone 
to escalating commitment. This effect goes beyond what can be explained by the value individuals might 
assign to winning per se (Sheremeta, 2010; Van den Bos et al., 2008), and it cannot be attributed to 
unfamiliarity with the auction situation or the computer interface. Table 6 summarizes the various 
interventions we tested and their effectiveness in reducing competitive escalation. Participants were abl
to learn not to engage in escalatory behavior from direct experience in exactly the same or a structurally 
similar task, but not from direct experience in a similar task that lacked the escalation aspect. We also 
tested the effects of two types of indirect experience: Vicariously learning about others’ outcomes in the 
same situation was effective in reducing competitive escalation. In contrast, mentally simulating the 
escalation point, at which one player bids the value of the prize, did not reduce competitive escalation – 
the dollar auction is not a mere “parlor trick”. Furthermore, mentally simulating the experience in 
combination with (or without) setting a limit—an intervention that resembles a ‘goal-setting’ intervention 
known to prevent classical escalation of commitment—had no effect on competitive escalation.  
---------------------------------------------- 




Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Our work on competitive escalation casts further light on the emotional aspects of organizational 
decision making, as called for in prior research (e.g., Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998; 
Walsh, 1995). Specifically, our interventions allowed us to test whether competitive escalation situations 
are particularly challenging because of a ‘hot‒c ld’ empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000). If 
competitive escalation were not driven by a ‘hot’ state of competitive arousal, then a ‘goal-setting’ 
intervention known to prevent classical escalation of commitment (Simonson & Staw, 1992) should have 
been effective. However, consistent with the ‘hot‒c ld’ empathy gap, we found that participants did not 
anticipate how they would feel once the escalation started. Having entered the ‘hot’ state, they ignored the 
goal they had set themselves in a ‘cold’ state. This is consistent with a ‘restraint bias’ proposed by 
Nordgren, Van Harreveld, and Van Der Pligt (2009): Individuals who feel in control of their impulses, a 
feeling that could arise once they have set themselve  a goal, tend to overexpose themselves to 
temptation. Once the temptation takes effect and they become aroused, they feel different from their own 
past self who set a goal in the ‘cold’ state and thus no longer feel committed to their goal. This process 
unfolds because participants do not anticipate entering a ‘hot’ state. Competitive arousal might not only 
catch individuals unaware, it may also be hard to make sense of and be prone to misattribution (Schachter 
& Singer, 1962). In many negotiation situations, a positive interpretation of arousal may be useful and
improve individual performance (Brown & Curhan, 2013), while a negative interpretation leads to poorer 
outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). In competitive escalation situations, in contrast, a negative 
interpretation of arousal may be beneficial: It gives participants a reason not to enter the escalatory spiral. 
Vicarious learning seems to facilitate such a negative interpretation of arousal, because it clearly 
demonstrates the negative outcomes of other people in th  same situation. Participants informed in this
way are then willing to accept small losses from early bids. The vicarious-learning intervention gives 
individuals a justification to stop, an exit option that does not evoke a feeling of missing out or losing. 
Relative to the participants in Experiment 1a or Experiment 2, whose results they had observed, they 
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could still feel like winners. Indeed, feelings arising from a mere contemplation of losses have been 
linked to overbidding in social competition (Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, & Phelps, 2008). 
Interestingly, similar numbers of people in each experiment made at least one bid. Thus, vicarious 
learning does not affect whether or not people enter the auction in the first place, but it does affect 
whether they continue to engage in the escalation pr cess. The observed escalation is consistent with the 
suggestion that motivations shift not (only) toward relative comparison and a desire to win exogenously 
because of relational (Kilduff et al., 2016; Piezunka, Lee, Haynes, & Bothner, 2018) or structural features 
of the situation (Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 2013) but also endogenously as the competition unfolds ‘naturally’ 
(Malhotra, 2010). Our findings suggest that competitiv  arousal involves not only a shift toward giving 
absolute payoffs less weight and relative standing more weight but also a qualitative shift toward a ‘hot’ 
aroused state that calls for countermeasures other than a rational reassessment of one’s goals (see alo 
Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011, for their analysis of competition as a self-control problem). As Nobel laureate 
Thomas Schelling asks: “If I am too enraged to mind my behavior, how can I make myself count to ten?” 
(Schelling, 2006, p. 90). 
The inherent problem of taking rational measures to counteract an irrational state of mind is 
nicely illustrated by Elster’s example from Homer ’s Odyssey (Elster, 2000): Ulysses and all his men 
knew that it was essential to keep a certain distance from the Sirens’ island and that coming closer would 
result in their untimely death. Anticipating that their unspoken commitment to steer clear of the island 
would waver in the face of temptation, he ordered his men to tie him to the mast and to put beeswax in 
their ears before being exposed to the Sirens’ call. Thus, he acknowledged the futility of limits set in he 
absence of temptation and learned from the unfortunate examples of earlier vessels and their crews. In the 
present research, we showed that these insights apply not only to ship captains in mythological Ancient 
Greece but also to contemporary managers. We add competition to the list of visceral ‘hot’ states—
hunger, pain, fear, addiction, gambling, and sexual arousal—that are difficult for people in a ‘cold’ state 
to anticipate. Policy makers aiming to design institutions that can profit from competition and the 
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associated efficiency gains without suffering its harmful effects should be aware of how this ‘hot‒cold’ 
empathy gap affects competitive escalation. 
In our experiments, competition among bidders, time pressure, and sunk costs were sufficient to 
elicit competitive escalation. Similar conditions are found in many high-stakes situations faced by 
managers, such as patent wars, mergers and acquisitions, and arms races, to the extent that decision 
makers are also driven by factors beyond rational ad strategic considerations in such naturally occurring 
situations. Accordingly, researchers trying to understand these settings should not neglect the 
motivational consequences of competitive escalation and the ‘hot‒cold’ empathy gap. We believe that our 
micro level findings have implications for macro perspectives in the research field of competitive 
dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012; Hsieh, Tsai, & Chen, 2015). Competitive escalation could be a driver of 
competitive aggressiveness (Ferrier, 2001) and play a role in explaining red queen competition (Derfus, 
Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008). Aiming to bridge the micro and macro levels and to allow both 
research streams to cross-fertilize each other, competitive escalation could potentially be integrated in the 
awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework (Chen, 1996; Chen, Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007). 
While vicarious learning is not limited to competitive escalation situations, it is particularly useful 
for competitive situations, which are known to reduce search and exploration during the situation itself 
(Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, & Avrahami, 2014). Morever, it is particularly useful for situations that are 
prone to destructive consequences– situations in which direct experience would be very costly. At the 
same time, it is more challenging for organizations a d individuals to learn from failure (Dahlin, Chuang, 
& Roulet, 2017). For instance, people often focus on successful others and ignore selection processes that 
could have eliminated unsuccessful others from the considered population, which likely leads to 
misleading conclusions: Among the observed survivors, competitive and risky behavior appears related to 
performance, but those players who acted in similarly competitive and risky ways and did not survive ar
not visible (Denrell, 2003). Instead of trying to learn from particularly successful others, others who are 
particularly similar to oneself, or even from one’s own history (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991), our 
vicarious learning intervention focused on others who faced a similar situation. Granted, it will be harder 
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to compile such a group of others in naturally occurring situations—outside of an experimental paradigm. 
At the same time, our results illustrate how well vicarious learning from others who faced a similar 
situation could serve as the basis for an intervention—which could be used in management education and 
training. In this sense, vicarious learning might be a le to bridge the gap between description and 
experience (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig, Hogarth, & Lejarraga, 2018) by confronting 
learners with outcomes experienced by others in addition to reading the description of the game.  
Methodological considerations 
In this paper, we combine lab and online experimentation, and we believe much can be gained by 
this strategy of first establishing a phenomenon in the lab where participants play against other 
participants for higher stakes and then moving to an nline setting in which sample sizes can be scaled up 
to ensure that the earlier results are not spurious and solely based on sampling variation. The use of 
“computer players”, who are programmed to resemble laboratory participants and, thereby, enable both 
tightly controlled and deception-free interactions, proved to be a valuable tool and can be recommended 
for future experimenters. That participants engaged in similarly competitive behavior both against other 
human participants in the lab and computer players online highlights what can be done in Internet 
experiments without large technical effort and without deception (see Arechar, Gächter, & Molleman, 
2018, for a more general discussion of conducting interactive online experiments). 
Another methodological contribution of this paper is the development of a novel task in 
Experiment 3, the dynamic chicken game. This game allowed us to test whether people could transfer 
what they learned in one competitive escalation situation, the dollar auction, to a structurally similar 
situation, the dynamic chicken game. We find strong support for this hypothesis and hope the dynamic 
chicken game can serve future investigators as an interesting paradigm to study competitive escalation, 
and, for instance, to test learning from dollar auction experiences and interventions (for example, how
long such learning effects last).  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations of the present research should be noted. Although we based our predictions on 
prior research on ‘hot‒cold’ empathy gaps and competitive arousal, we colle ted only behavioral and self-
report data and no physiological measures. Yet, paricipants’ self-reported affect, which significantly 
correlates with the degree of escalation, and participants’ post-experiment comments strongly support ou  
theorizing that ‘hot’ competitive arousal is driving the escalation. For instance, one participant wroe, 
“The rise of excitement made me lose my sense of the game”; others stated, “It is horrible to let oneself 
get carried away”, or “It destabilized me and made me lose control over the game” and even “stress, 
neither method nor order to arrive at things, an urge to always bid more to win the auction”14 (see 
Supplementary Materials for a larger selection of comments from participants of Experiment 3). 
Nevertheless, future research could dig deeper into the underlying process by showing how 
(physiological) arousal develops when the first bids are made and how this ‘hot’ state can change the 
focus from absolute gains to beating other players, thus fueling escalation. Another avenue for future 
research would be to explore how long the learning effects last and how they might be refreshed.  
We investigated competitive arousal in individual decision making. In contrast to many 
organizational settings, our decision makers were nither embedded in a group or hierarchy nor 
accountable to others for their decisions. Although this approach allowed us to develop and test a minimal 
paradigm, future research could add and manipulate some of these variables. For instance, will groups 
engage in stronger competitive escalation than individuals because of groupthink (Choi & Kim, 1999; 
Janis, 1972) or spreading of competitive arousal through emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002)? Or will 
groups act more rationally than individuals (White, Hafenbrädl, Hoffrage, Reisen, & Woike, 2011)? Will 
vicarious learning also work on the group level as a de-escalation strategy? The proposed paradigm can 
be easily adapted to have groups making bidding decisions together, allowing these and related question  
to be studied in future research.  
                                                      
14 Translated from French from participants in Experiment 1 
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Managers could benefit from training in effective ways of addressing emotions (Shepherd, 2004) 
and, more specifically, as we have shown, emotions resulting from competitive escalation situations. 
Identifying which type of experience can best help people learn to avoid competitive escalation is a first
step, but future research could design and validate interventions specifically for organizational contexts. 
Such methods could be included in executive education nd MBA curricula. In particular, as we have 
shown that the auction is not a mere “parlor trick” that becomes trivial once you think about the escalation 
point in which the game changes, future research could f cus more deeply on how the auction can be used
as an educational intervention. It could not only aim t measuring spillover effects from playing the 
auction, such as on behavior in the dynamic chicken game that we have shown in Experiment 3 but also 
focus on real-life behavioral changes. Another avenue for future research is to further explore the 
potential of vicarious learning to prepare executives for competitive escalation situations. For instace, 
could instructors in MBA classrooms provide detailed examples of competitive escalation processes in 
organizations and illustrate their consequences, and would this equip students to avoid competitive 
escalation in their future careers? Or could the students themselves share their experiences, thereby 
creating opportunities for vicarious learning? Future research could also look into questions such as how 
vicarious learning opportunities in the classroom can be designed and structured to be most effective.  
Conclusion 
Managers are frequently exposed to competitive escalation situations, such as patent races, 
bidding wars for corporate mergers, or arms races between rival companies. The proposed minimal dollar 
auction paradigm reliably recreates such situations in the laboratory and online. This shows how easily 
competitive escalation can be elicited and highlights t e need for effective de-escalation strategies. By 
connecting the literature on competitive arousal with the theory on ‘hot‒cold’ empathy gaps and the 
learning literature, we have shown that competitive escalation is fundamentally different from escalation 
of commitment and thus calls for different countermasures: a goal-setting strategy effective in reducing 
escalation of commitment has no effect in competitiv  escalation situations. However, consistent with 
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Means, Standard Deviations and Medians of the Highest and Second-Highest Bids (in CHF) 
Across Conditions in Experiment 1a
Highest bid Second-highest bid   
Condition Auction type M SD Mdn  M SD Mdn 
Repeated dollar auction Dollar (1st)  14.64 7.94 13.00  13.89 7.89 11.25 
 Dollar (2nd)  5.39 3.47 5.25  4.32 3.63 3.25 
First-price auction First-price  9.46 1.55 10.00  8.93 1.62 9.75 





Means, Standard Deviations and Medians of the Highest and Second-Highest Bids (in CHF) in 
Experiment 1b 
Highest bid Second-highest bid  
Condition Auction type M SD Mdn M SD Mdn  
Executives Dollar (1st) 15.32 8.51 13.25 14.96 8.48 13.00 






Means, Standard Deviations and Medians of the Highest and Second-Highest Bids (in CHF) Across 
Conditions in Experiment 1c 
Highest bid Second-highest bid  
Condition Auction type M SD Mdn  M SD Mdn 
Goal setting Dollar 29.93 38.26 12.75  28.21 39.10 11.00 
Vicarious learning Dollar (1st) 7.11 2.96 7.50  6.64 2.96 6.25 
 Dollar (2nd) 3.32 3.27 2.00  2.25 3.01 1.25 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics Across Conditions in Experimnt 2 
TABLE 4 
Dollar Auction Results Experiment 2 
  Highest bid % placed 
bid 
% placed bid 




Condition M SD Mdn 
        
Baseline 64.6 35.05 52 100 54 22 50 
Goal setting 55.5 32.31 50 100 39 10 41 
Mental simulation general 63.3 39.19 50 96 49 27 51 
Mental simulation escalation point 59.6 38.62 52 92 55 16 51 










  Highest bid % placed 
bid 
% placed bid 




Condition M SD Mdn 
Dollar auction games:  
        
 
Dollar auction (baseline) 42.2 33.03 38 95 26 11 195 
        
Dollar auction after first-price auction (46) 59.9 38.07 51 94 50 26 106 
Dollar auction after first-price auction (50) 48.8 42.05 48 86 43 20 102 
        
Vicarious learning 34.0 32.34 26 88 18 8 200 
Goal setting 43.0 33.92 32 94 28 10 196 
 
Other games:        
        
First-price auction, opponent stops at 46 36.8 14.54 46 96 3 34 106* 
First-price auction, opponent stops at 50 38.7 14.24 46 99 10 10 102* 
Chicken game only 60.7 38.56 55 91 58 27 
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Chicken game after dollar auction (baseline) 43.5 42.6 30 73 38 23 194* 
        












Overview of tested interventions to reduce competitiv  escalation 
Type of experience Concrete intervention Experiment Hypothesis Effective? 
     
Direct experience     
in a competitive 
escalation situation 
Playing the dollar auction     
    DV: Second dollar auction 1a, 1b 2 Yes 
    DV: Dynamic chicken game 3 2 Yes 
  
   
in a competitive 
situation without 
escalation 
Playing a first-price auction 1a, 3 3 No 
  
   
Indirect experience  
   
Vicarious learning Learning about the payoffs of others 1c, 3 4 Yes 
  
   
Mental simulation + 
Limit Setting 
Mentally simulating the auction and 
setting a limit 
1c, 2, 3 5 No 
  
   
Mental simulation only Mentally simulating the auction  2 - No 
Parlor trick Mentally simulating the escalation point  2 - No 
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Figure 1. Example of the bidding process in the minimal dollar auction paradigm. The x-axis represents 
time, the y-axis represents bid values, and players’ bid  are represented by different line types. Theblu  
dashed line marks CHF 10.00. Player 4 started the bidding by placing her only bid at CHF 0.5. Player 3 
entered the auction next but dropped out after two bids (at approximately 45 seconds), leaving players 1 
and 2 to bid against each other. They exceeded the CHF 10.00 mark in small steps, ending with player 1 
making the highest bid of CHF 22.00 for CHF 10.00, and player 2 paying the second-highest bid of 












































Figure 2. Results of Experiment 3. Panel A depicts the distribution of the highest bids in the dollar 
auction in each of the experimental conditions, including their means and 95% CIs. Panel B depicts the 





1. Selected comments after Experiment 3, in response to the question 
“How did you experience the game you just played?” (in alphabetical 
order, unedited as entered by participants) 
 
1. After learning that only 17 out of 100 people even made a few cents, while 80 of them lost 
money, it did not seem like it was worthwhile to play.  It was extremely unlikely that I would win 
the .50, so why lose anything? 
2. As one may notice from reviewing the results of the auction, I chose not to bid.  In light of this, 
the game itself wasn't too interesting but formulating my approach was.  I initially considered 
how I would behave if caught with a high bid, and realized hat I would likely be caught in a cycle 
of escalation that would cause me to lose money.  The statistics that were then presented to me 
confirmed this suspicion, and in light of this I opted to use a safe position and keep my bonus by 
not bidding. 
3. Ashamed at getting caught up in it 
4. At first I was caught up in the bidding, then I realized it's dumb to bid money to win money. So I 
had a cutoff point where I wasn't really gaining much by continuing to bid. 
5. Even though it was a computer I wanted to inflict financial damage to it when it drove the bid up 
past 50 cents 
6. Felt like I was on a last minute bidding war on eBay. However, I felt no matter how much I bid, I 
was always going to be outbid all the way to 50 cents. 
7. hoping the other player would back down - ha! 
8. I am not entirely sure what is meant by this question, but I felt like it was a pretty good 
representation of human behavior. People don't want to be a loser, it's why the price escalates, 
because even thought you're in the hole you want to feel like a winer by coming out on top and 
making sure the guy you're playing against lost more money than you did. 
9. I bid more than I thought I would because I got caught up. 
10. I didn't like the odds presented before the auction, I felt that my chances of winning a bid were 
not worth going for. I tried out a bid to see if the computer would continue to increase the bid, 
and when it did, I instead decided to keep my cents. 
11. I didn't see the point of bidding. If we escalate, then we both lose money. If I don't bid, the other 
player gets more, and I don't lose anything. 
12. I didn't want to lose 50 cents, but I didn't want to quit bidding. Very frustrating! 
13. I enjoyed it very much. It reminded me of those penny auction sites which I tried once several 
years ago. I was not successful during that auction either. For this game, I felt very competitive 
and determined to win. The payout really didn’t matter, I jst wanted to win without losing 
money. 
14. I enjoyed the experience and I liked the simulation of strategically bidding against competitors. I 
pretended that I was in a room with my competitor when responding with my bids. I felt the 
need to keep bidding in similar increments. 
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15. I enjoyed the experience. I have gotten in many bidding wars on eBay trying to get something I 
wanted and paid way more than I should of because I refused to lose. 
16. I enjoyed the game. In the first 50 cent bidding I felt shut out. In the second scenario I was 
determined to win . Unfortunately I overpaid. Honestly as we progressed through the second 
process I was determined to win and punish the other bidder. I knew i they kept up bidding, I 
would win but receive the 50 cents and come out ahead of the other bidder. Sounds even 
dumber as I type it. 
17. I enjoyed the game. It kept me on my toes and had me determined to win however after 
repeatedly losing against my opponent I wasn't sure that I would ever win. 
18. I experienced an adrenaline rush accompanied by the feeling of pressure and anxiety. Also I 
heightened sense of trying to out guess my opponent. 
19. I experienced it as stressful and irritating.  The computer kept bidding past the point where I 
expected it to.  During the part where I wasn't going to be paying my bid, I didn't mind bidding 
up to max, but during the part where I had to pay my bid, I ket bidding just so that I wasn't 
losing money for no reason and possibly to outbid the computer for spite.  It was very annoying. 
20. I experienced it competitively!!!  I wanted to win! 
21. I feel stupid honestly. I never normally act like that. I tend to cut and run and make safe choices. 
22. I fell into the trap of bidding higher without thinking about the actual cost. Like many, I assume, 
winning became more important than the prize. I actually bid more than I could have won. 
23. I felt as if it was a losing battle to win the bidding war. If I continued to bid both players would 
lose. 
24. I felt as though in the end the game was rigged so that I lost my maximum bonus payment. But I 
really felt like I learned something about myself. I need to think more strategically before 
becoming too involved in situations where I stand to lose something 
25. I felt competitive and was surprised the computer didn't stop the bidding. 
26. I felt like at one point I was bidding to lose. 
27. I felt that yes, I was getting sucked in to escalation behavior and I knew I should stop. I knew 
that my opponent was also stuck too. So I ended it because I knew there was no winning it. 
28. I felt the getting sucked in to wanting to bet higher. And then I realized I will have to deduct 
what I bet. That made me stop. 
29. I figured since 80% of participants lost money in the game, it would make the most sense to just 
keep my 1.20 bonus and come out even. 
30. I found it frustrating.  I wanted to win, but I didn't want to lose the money I already had. 
31. i found it very competive. I had a feeling that we would never stop bidding. 
32. I found it very stressful, similar to if I were gambling outside of the context of this survey. 
33. I found myself giving in to the escalation behavior of the bidding process, but felt I had made a 
commitment to my highest bid and was going to stick to it. I felt going beyond my highest bid 
would be caused by my ego's desire to win more than the value o what I was bidding for. 
34. I got way too caught up in the experience and overgambled. 
35. I had chosen before it started to not pay anything for the bonus as the majority of people lost 
money. However once it began it was very hard to not bid. I felt anxious and it felt as though I 
was losing money by not bidding even though I knew that it wasmore likely I'd lose money by 
bidding. 
36. i kept my maximum bid to under the goal i set to ensure i didn't go over in an escalation war. 
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37. I knew the computer would overbid me each time, so as I read the rules I set myself a limit and 
made the decision I would not bid over that limit. I think this game is fun for strategy, and might 
be a good way to teach children self control before they ar eligible to actually gamble. 
38. I looked at the information given that only 17 players came out without losing money and 
assumed that the bidding escalated for either fear of losing or hope of winning. I opted to make 
a single bid to see if the other player would bid. They bid so I quit Better to lose a little than a 
lot. 
39. I outbid more than I initially committed to spend.  I felt compelled to win even though I knew I 
was going to be losing more and more money. 
40. I realized as the bidding escalated, and both I and my computer opponent met and then passed 
the break-even point that this wasn't a winning auction, so much as a damage-control auction. 
Finally, I realized I'd do better to stop bidding so far past the vaue of what I was bidding on, and 
just accept the loss I'd so far accumulated. So I felt emotionally distressed as the bidding hit and 
then passed the value point of fifty cents. 
41. I realized my mistaken strategy only after completing play, which made me a little mad at 
myself. 
42. I realized that it would have been smarter to stop the bid immediately, instead of trying to go 
for the 50 cent bid, because I would only have to pay 2 cents. I got caught in the escalation war 
lol. 
43. I saw that so many were losing money and I am one of those people who once I get started I 
cant stop.  Based on the fact that there was a very good chance I would lose money even if I 
won the auction I chose not to bid at all and keep the entire 120 
44. I thought at first I would only bid up to 25 cents but when the auction started I figured I already 
lost 25 cents so I might as well go for it all. 
45. I thought it was a fun game.  The more the other player bid, the more I wanted to bid in order to 
get the prize. 
46. I thought it was much like real life, where you get competitive and try to beat the other guy 
even at a loss to yourself. But I tried to be smart and not get sucked in. 
47. I thought the opponent would stop bidding once it got closer to and then passed .50. I was 
wrong though. I rarely take risks, this is why. 
48. I thought to myself it would be "worth it" to pay up to half the value for the 50 cents but really 
this was stupid because I had to pay even though I lost. I should never have bid at all. 
49. I tried to approach it calmly. After I set my limit initially and was thinking about it, I had a very 
brief moment of panic when you told me the limit I set wasn't going to be enforced 
automatically. It would have been so easy to fall into a bidding war, ut I felt like that wouldn't 
benefit me in the long run since the computer opponent had less to risk than I did in the end. 
Once I hit my limit I tried to push the I don't want to bid any more button as soon as possible so 
I didn't second guess myself. 
50. I tried to win the bid, and now regret not going higher because if I had won the bid I'll still get 
the .50 and only would have lost a few cents to pay back compared to the whole amount I bid if 
I had won. 
51. I wanted really wanted to win, but I also wanted to stick to my guns on how much I was willing 
to spend. But, I enjoyed the game all the same. 
52. I wanted to win and lost sight of the goal. 
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53. I wanted to win even though it cost money and time. Competition makes us irrational? 
54. I wanted to win no matter the cost, so I kept bidding 
55. I wanted to win. I do not gamble but I found out that if I did, I would be a poor man. 
56. I was a little surprised by how much the computer was willing to pay for the bid. 
57. I was addicted to winning. I didn't want to back down even though I knew the price was getting 
too high. 
58. I was anxious about loosing too much money, I had a set amount in my head that I would 
gamble and I went a little above what I previously decided. I knew the odds weren't good that I 
would win yet the allure still drew me in. 
59. I was assuming the other player would stop bidding before the 50 cent mark, and I was a little 
confused at first why the bidding was still escalating after it exceeded 50 cents. After I realized I 
could only lose more money instead of gaining more, I trie to push it just a little bit higher, but 
I'd rather accept my loss of about 60 cents than keep pushing it up to 80 or $1.00. It was very 
frustrating after the amount exceeded 50 cents and I was mentally unprepared for a "strategy" 
or limit after it had ben exceeded. 
60. I was aware that as soon as we started bidding, there would be no way to stop without just 
accepting our loss. Even once it gets to the point where we start to lose money, we would have 
to continue bidding to "minimize" the amount that we lost. Knowing tht, I decided to not bid 
and to just keep the initial 120 cents. 
61. I was cautious with bidding, as I did not want to escalate and lose all possible money or have to 
pay. 
62. I was competitive and wanted to win at all costs. 
63. I was competitive. I was a little angry and at the moment did not really care about the money. It 
was about wining. 
64. I was extremely determined to win the money as every cent counts in our household. I was 
determined to get more for my family. They were the motivation for me to continue to try. 
65. I was pissed because the other person wouldn't quit bidding haha 
66. I was tempted to keep upping my bid, but I didn't want to lose money, so I just stopped. I 
figured that the other player would just keep upping their bid too, so we'd both end up with 
very little or nothing left. 
67. I wouldn't have really bid more than double what it was worth, but if I was going to lose it 
anyways, may as well go big. 
68. It is like ebay. trying to get something you want an out bidding others to get even if you pay a 
higher price than you want to 
69. It reminded me alot of e-bay. Bidding on something and not knowing when the other person will 
stop, or if they will stop at a reasonable point. I would often worry if I was in a bidding war on 
ebay for something I really wanted, if it really was a person oing the other bidding or if it was a 
bot. Knowing that the other bidder was a bot in this experience brought back memories of that. 
70. It seemed somewhat realistic to how an actual person would play but at the same time, it also 
felt like it was a game that I couldn't win. 
71. It was a little frustrating. I tested the water with a larger bid, and felt like we would have just 
competed in a bidding war and I would have lost all my bonus money. I much prefer to just walk 
away when I know I'm ahead rather than risking leaving with othing. 
72. It was a little stressful wondering if to increase my bid 
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73. It was an interesting experience. I totally forgot about the consequences and got into the game 
too much. 
74. it was an interesting game, I felt like when I'm bidding on ebay. This time it was easier to stop 
because I knew the actual value of the price and I wouldn't go as high as the value just to win. 
75. it was exciting and kept pushing me wanting to outbid. 
76. It was frustrating and it felt like a game of chicken 
77. It was frustrating to me because I'm very competitive and eventually just lost the whole bonus. 
78. It was fun but def could feel the urge to want to win. 
79. It was fun, but also a bit nerve-racking.  I lost track of the bidding objective and just wanted to 
beat my opponents bids, which probably not the right way to go about it. 
80. It was interesting, I can understand the need to win over possibly losing money. I chose not to 
lose everything. 
81. It was interesting.  But it felt like the other player was going to continue outbidding until the 
end. 
82. It was interesting. Once I passed 50 cents, I did not know what was the right choice anymore. 
83. IT WAS JUST LIKE BIDDING ON EBAY, DROVE ME NUTS LOSING MY TOP BID! 
84. It was kind of nerve racking I really anted to win but I also did not want to lose my money. 
85. It was nerve wracking and I lamented the bids the computer opponent made against me. It was 
exciting overall though 
86. My experience thought me that it is sometimes better to let the other person win. 
87. My first thought was to just let the computer win the money because I would lose nothing, but 
then I got greedy and thought that maybe I could snag some extra money with a small bid. Then 
I kept escalating until I realized we could bid more than the actua value of the prize money. A 
shame. 
88. My initial thought, which I wish I would have listened to, was to not bid and take my bonus 
without winning. Instead I tried to be the highest bidder but ended up losing my whole bonus. 
89. My original thought was to stop around 30 cents but then I realized I would lose much more 
money so I kept going and ultimately I decided I was just going to lose money all the way around 
and there was no winning so I gave up and admitted defeat. 
90. Seems like the best way to play the game is not to play the game. 
91. Since I knew 80% lost money I didn't want to take the chance and I didn't bid. 
92. That was fun!  The first game there was no chance of losing real money so I kept bidding trying 
to win the .50.  The second game however when I knew I would have to pay how much I bid, I 
bid a little trying to win the extra .50 but then stopped because I idn't want to lose any more 
money.  Again this was really fun.  Thanks! 
93. The bidding game was intense. I wasn't sure what to do in terms of wanting to bid more or not. 
94. The game made me somewhat angry because my opponent would not give up. I was also 
frustrated with myself because I would not give up and lost money due to my pride. 
95. The game seemed like a lose lose situation honestly. I bet but when I was losing money I 
stopped betting. 
96. The game was interesting.  I started it determined not to bet too much and then found myself 




97. Tried to act the same as I would in real life. Made me nervous to lose control and spend too 
much. 
98. Ups and downs in emotion 
99. Very hostile. I felt I was playing against a real player. 
100. You mean my strategy? Well, I thought of it as having $1.20, with a slight chance of 
gaining some extra money, but a greater chance of losing money. Since I couldn't know how 
logical the other decision maker was, I could very well have "won" the bidding, ut still lost 
money overall. And of course I could both lose the bidding and money. So I was only willing to 
bid a very low amount, and didn't try to play chicken with the ai bidding process. In short I had 





2. Regression tables 
 
Regression analysis for Experiment 2.  
Experimental condition B SE t 
    
baseline 0   
goal setting -9.088 
  
7.713   
-  
1.18    
mental simulation (general) -1.345 
  
7.286   
-   
.18    
mental simulation (escalation point) -4.992 
  
7.286   
-   
.69    
    
Constant 64.60*** 
  
5.177   
 
12.48    
Note: N = 193, * p<0.05, ** p<0.001   
 
 
Regression analysis for Experiment 3.  
Experimental condition B SE t 
    
baseline 0   
first price (46) 17.75** 
 
4.237    4.19    
first price (50) 6.611 
 
4.291    1.54    
vicarious learning -8.109* 
 
3.534   
- 
2.29    
goal setting 0.846 
 
3.551    0.24    
    
Constant 42.15** 
 
2.514   16.77    





3. Appendix A: Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Dollar Auction 
The game-theoretic analysis of the dollar auction is not trivial. To make the analysis 
tractable, some structure needs to be added. For simplicity, we assume that there are two 
players, that the prize for which they bid is s, and that the players’ bankrolls (i.e., the maximal 
amount each player can bid) are given by b1 and b2. Finally, we assume that an exogenous 
mechanism randomly assigns the right to make the first bid to one of the two players. This 
player can decide whether to place a bid or to drop out. If he places a bid, the auction 
continues, and the other player can also decide to bid or to drop out. The second player’s bid 
has to surpass the first player’s by at least one unit of money. The right to make a bid alternates 
until one of the players decides to drop out. The player who made the last bid wins the auction. 
O’Neill (1986) showed that if players are rational and have perfect foresight, there is always an 
equilibrium of the following form: 
1. The first player places an initial bid. 
2. The second player decides to drop out and the game is over. 
O’Neill further showed that the optimal size of an initial bid that is sufficient to ‘scare off’ the 
second player depends on the details of the game. In particular, it matters whether or not the 
two players’ bankrolls are identical. 
In our experiment, the bankroll is not precisely defined. One could reasonably argue 
that the bankroll is identical for both players and corresponds to CHF 38.00, i.e., the amount 
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that participants earn during a 90-minute session in the lab. O’Neill demonstrated that in the 
case of identical bankrolls (b1 = b2 = b), the optimal initial bid is defined as15 
(b − 1) mod (s − 1) + 1.  
Given the parameters of our experiment, this equation yields an optimal initial bid of 
CHF 8.75.16 However, because in our experiments the bankroll is not clearly defined, it is 
impossible for players to calculate the bid size for the equilibrium strategy. No player in any of 
the experiments—either those reported in the literature or our own—seems to have relied on 




                                                      
15 ‘mod’ stands for Modulo, which is an operation that returns the remainder of an integer division. Forinstance, 7 
mod 3 would return 1, as 7 = 3 x 2 + 1. 
16 CHF 38.00 is equivalent to 152 units of the minimal bid size of CHF 0.25. The stakes are CHF 10.00, or 40 units of 
CHF 0.25. Thus, the optimal bid can be calculated as (152 − 1) mod (40 − 1) + 1 = 35, which is CHF 8.75. 
 
